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I. INTRODUCTION
Copyright is essentially a contract between the author and the public with
the government acting as the agent of the public.1 The consideration received
by authors is defined by duration and breadth of exclusivity.2 The
consideration for the public is the creation of a “work” that will be available on
a limited basis for the life of the author plus seventy years and then available
without limit after that.3 If there were no transaction costs at all, it would be
possible to “pay” authors different amounts of exclusivity. Perhaps a greeting
card would get one holiday season of exclusivity, if anything. Works that are
not original and do not demonstrate a modicum of creativity would not qualify
as consideration and receive no exclusivity in return.4 And, in some cases, an
author—say one writing a book that will be a guaranteed best seller—could be
required to pay a considerable amount of the right to exclusivity that makes
those earnings possible. By necessity the contract in question is a form contract
which, unlike other forms, is drafted to the disadvantage of the drafter.5
This Article tracks the similarities of copyright law and contract law and
suggests that viewing copyright as basically contractual would result in a much
more rational system of copyright law. The analysis focuses on three specific
areas. Part II is about the “bargain” principle of contract formation. In
contract law this means there is reciprocity between what each party contributes
to the exchange. In the context of copyright, as in any contractual arrangement,
this would mean each party should attempt to strike the best bargain from its
perspective. It makes sense for this to be true of the bargain struck by the

1 The actions of the agent are reflected today in the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–
805 (2012). This possibility in the context of patent law has been noted by at least one court, Davis
Airfoils v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 350, 352 (Ct. Cl., 1954); and a scholar, Shubha Ghosh, Patents and
the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315
(2004).
2 Duration for most works is now the life of the author plus seventy years. The breadth of
protection depends on a variety of factors. The principal one is the availability of a work for fair
use. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). In addition, courts often refer to works as having thin protection as
opposed to, presumably, broader protection. This typically refers to works that reflect little in the
way of originality. See, e.g., Beaudin v. Ben and Jerry’s Homemade, Inc., 95 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 1996);
Santava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003).
3 This is the standard duration people for works completed in 1978 or after.
Works
completely prior to that time and various other works are subject to different periods of
exclusivity (see 17 U.S.C. § 303).
4 Originality is a statutory requirement, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), and means roughly that the work is
not copied. There is a requirement that the work include a “slight” or a “modicum” amount of
creativity. This is expressed best in Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–
46 (1991).
5 In this case the drafter would be Congress.
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government on behalf of the public. In fact, the cost of copyright to the public
is comparable to tax and should be as low as possible to achieve the desired
end.
Part III takes on the notion of a breach. From a contractual perspective an
infringement is comparable to a breach by the public because it is inconsistent
with the promise of exclusivity. A breach by the author is a more difficult
concept but can be viewed as a breach of the author’s promise to create an
original work that represents a modicum of creativity.6 An author who claims
exclusivity but does not deliver has, in effect, breached the copyright contract.
The relative lack of formality in the case of the copyright contract as opposed
to a conventional contract adds to the complexity of this analysis.7
Part IV considers remedies and argues for a remedy like the one used in
contract law. The current basic monetary remedy works like a property rule as
opposed to a liability rule.8 It does this by firmly steering the secondary user
into a negotiation with the copyright holder as a matter of self interest. In so
doing, it protects interests that the Copyright Act does not grant.9 Specifically,
the current remedy is an indirect way of protecting moral rights,10 which play
only a minor role in U.S. copyright law.11 In addition, current remedies are
unnecessarily costly and inappropriate in a context in which the rights owned by
the parties are ill-defined.12
See text at infra notes 41–48.
As will be discussed, authors need not indicate in any formal sense whether they are entering
into a copyright contract.
8 Under 17 U.S.C. § 504 the infringer must pay damages plus any profit earned as a result of
the infringement.
As will be described in greater depth below, see text at infra notes 60–62, a liability rule means
that when a right may be violated without consent and the victim only receives compensation. In
the case of a property rule, the interference with the rights of another must be consensual. In the
field of intellectual property as well as others, a property rule is usually associated with injunctive
relief which requires secondary users to negotiate for the right to use a protected work. The damage
rules in copyright do not require a negotiation but firmly encourage it.
9 One deviation from this proposal is the possible inclusion of punitive damages in contexts
in which detection of infringement is difficult. See infra text at notes 56–58.
10 Under the Berne Convention moral rights are defined as follows:
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and
to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other
derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his
honor or reputation.
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Revision, 1971)
Art. 6bis., July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
11 The limited adoption of moral rights by the United States is found in the Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990. 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
12 For an early theoretical defense of the status quo, see Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter,
An Economic Analysis of the Damage Rule in Intellectual Property, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1585 (1998).
6
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Part V reviews specific lessons from contract law that, if adopted, would
result in a more rational system of copyright law. They include: (1) incentives
for greater formality;13 (2) distinguishing copyright dependent works from those
that are not; (3) sanctions for the false claims of copyright; and (4) the use of a
liability rule as opposed to a property rule in instances of infringement.
Before beginning the analysis and primarily for the benefit of those who
may not understand the underpinnings of U.S. copyright law, a few
observations may be useful. One of the reasons why contract law is an
appropriate standard for copyright law is that U.S. Copyright law is utilitarian in
nature. This follows from the Constitutional enabling provision that the
purpose of copyright is to “promote the Progress of Science and Useful arts”
and it achieves this by granting exclusive rights to “authors and inventors.”14 In
short, copyright protection is not awarded to authors unless it is consistent with
promoting public welfare.15 Authors are a means to an end just as each party to
a contract is a means to achieving his or her counterpart’s ends. Not only does
this invite a contractual approach to copyright, it also makes for an analysis that,
unlike that in a context of moral rights, has a more economic orientation. For
example, in theory, since exclusivity is granted to encourage creativity and that
exclusivity is a cost to the public, it makes little sense to grant exclusivity
beyond that necessary to bring forth the creative effort. This theme is
unavoidable when assessing U.S. copyright law and will be reflected in the
analysis that follows.
A final important point is that some of what is discussed below with respect
to the deviation of U.S. copyright law from a contract law model is dictated by
international agreement. These cases will be indicated throughout the analysis.
The suggested revisions proposed in the final section are designed to comply
with these international accords.

13 This would, of course, have to be consistent with the requirements of the Berne
Convention, of which the United States is a member:
The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any
formality; such enjoyment and such exercise shall be independent of the
existence of protection in the country of origin of the work. Consequently,
apart from the provisions of this Convention, the extent of protection, as well as
the means of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be
governed exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed.
Berne Convention, supra note 10, art. 5.
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15 The public, as opposed to private, welfare notion underlies an important recent article on
patent remedies. See Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law or “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV.
517 (2014).
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II. THE BARGAIN AND ITS TERMS
Copyright law is obviously necessary to offset the free riding effects that
would mean there would be little motivation for many authors to be
productive.16 If authors are dependent on income from their works and unable
to internalize the value because it can be taken freely by others, it seems clear
the net effect on society would be negative. The fact that copyright law is
necessary does not mean, however, it should become untethered to the
fundamental reality that those granting exclusivity are doing so in order to
benefit the public and that exclusivity is a cost to the public. There is no policy
reason the cost to the public should be more than the minimum necessary.
In this transaction, government can fairly be viewed as both buyer and seller.
The government sells exclusivity in order to buy the availability of an author’s
works. Authors, in turn, sell access and buy exclusivity. Nevertheless, there is
no serious discussion suggesting that the duty of the agent is to authors as
opposed to the public.17
Copyright law is necessary to achieve the desired ends primarily because of
transaction costs. It would be impossible for authors through a massive system
of private contracts to achieve the exclusivity necessary to protect any serious
investment in their creative efforts. Thus, the starting point for assessing the
copyright contract is a default position that represents what would happen in
the absence of transaction costs. Presumably the (government) seller and the
author would meet. The author would indicate what is offered—a greeting card
rhyme, a song, a compilation, a great work of fiction—and the agent would
indicate what would be offered in terms of duration and breadth of exclusivity
to ensure the work would come into being. In short, the negotiation would
focus on the value of the work and the amount of exclusivity—as measured by
time and breadth—that would be “paid” for the work.
16 Creative activity like that addressed by copyright law is generally non-excludable and nonrivalrous which means, without copyright, authors would be unable to internalize the benefits of
their works.
17 See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of the United
States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors.”); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ Sacrificial
days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services
rendered.”); Twentieth Century Musi Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“Creative work is
to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of
promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The immediate effect
of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim
is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”).
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In this hypothetical negotiation a number of things might be expected.
First, the agent of the public would be expected to bargain on behalf of the
public. As a corollary, if no consideration in the form of exclusivity were
required for the work to be produced, none would be offered. The work of the
author would be gratuitous. Second, the agent would pay the lowest price
possible for the work based on some general calculation of the work’s value to
the actual buyers. In this sense, the agent has tremendous market power since
there are few substitutes for copyright. This power would be used to negotiate
to the author’s reservation price—the lowest the seller/author would find
acceptable. In fact, for a well-known author who is likely to sell many books
and may have received a multi-million dollar advance, the actual one-to-one
bargain may mean the consideration from the author includes not just the
availability of the work but a substantial sum of money in exchange for the
privilege of exclusivity.
Obviously, the one-to-one process is impractical, but, given that it would
otherwise be the ideal, it is useful to think about what the current copyright
contract is like and whether it could be moved closer to the ideal. There are
fundamental ways that copyright is inconsistent with the ideal but could be
reshaped to be closer to the ideal. Before detailing those “contractual errors,”
below, though, some of the oddities of copyright law that separate it not just
from a contract oriented approach but from even a rational system of
intellectual property should be noted. First, the length of exclusivity sold by the
government is largely disconnected from what is received by the public in
return. The most creative works and the least are paid the same. The
exclusivity offered—life plus seventy years18—is as much a function of age and
health as opposed to the work itself. In effect, two authors completing equally
valuable works receive greatly differing amounts of consideration from the
public as far as exclusivity.
This does not mean all authors are ultimately compensated equally. The
market makes huge distinctions with respect to ultimate compensation. Some
writings end up on a shelf forever and others become best-sellers earning
millions of dollars. Moreover, in addition to the time dimension of exclusivity,
there is a substance dimension. Some works are only thinly protected19 and
some are more likely to be subject to fair use.20 Thus, the public pays both in
terms of exclusivity and the amount paid for the use of a work. In effect, these
two interact to determine the ultimate consideration flowing from the public to

18 This would be the basic duration. There are other durations in the case of works for hire
and similar works. 17 U.S.C. § 302.
19 See cases cited in note 2, supra.
20 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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authors. The actual period of exclusivity is, however, unknowable at the time a
work is created and makes the notion of compensation based on value received
irrelevant.
More irrational from the point of view of contracts is that “gift works” are
paid for. These are works that would exist in the absence of copyright. One
example would be aleatory art—works that are found and displayed without any
thought of copyright.21 In addition, it seems doubtful that all, or perhaps even
most, creative people are driven by the notion that they have copyright
protection. Finally, it seems likely that a great many “works” are compelled by
market necessities but not by a promise of exclusivity. Although it is difficult to
support this with an empirical assessment, one might compare the greeting card
industry with the fashion industry. Fashion for the most part receives no
copyright protection.22 Greeting cards can be protected but, like fashion,
production is likely driven by the need to continually offer something new to
the public.23 The distinctions between the text of one greeting card company
and another are likely to be slight and awards more in line with novelty and not
exclusivity. In fact, in this instance, copyright may lead to less creativity since
there would be less pressure to present new ideas.
What is missing in these cases is what is essential in modern contract law—a
bargain. Bargain in this sense means an element of reciprocity.24 In contracts it
means a car is sold because of the price offered and money is paid in order to
receive a car. In copyright, this reciprocal element is missing. In other words,
works are not forthcoming in a great number of instances as a result of
copyright protection.25 Indeed, there may be no cognitive connection between
creative efforts and the promise of exclusivity.
21 Perhaps the outstanding example of an accidently created work is the famed Zapruder film
of the John Fitzgerald Kennedy assassination. Although Zapruder made artistic choices, the only
public value attributed to the film was the result of happenstance and certainly not the result of
conscious decisionmaking. See also ALAN ROSENTHAL, NEW CHALLENGES FOR DOCUMENTARY
421–30 (Univ. of Ca. Press 1988).
22 Fashions are creative works that are generally not covered by copyright. Yet there are
constant innovations and design changes. See generally Dianna Michelle Martínez, Fashionably Late:
Why the United States Should Copy France and Italy to Reduce Counterfeiting, 32 B.U. INT’L L.J. 509
(2014); Christine Quilichini, Haute Couture, Legislation: Tailor Made High Fashion Design Protection in
the United States, 4 U. PUERTO RICO BUS. L.J. 228 (2013).
23 For a discussion of the innovation given rise to by monopolistic competition see, Jeffrey L.
Harrison, Rationalizing the Allocative/Distributive Relationship in Copyright, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 853,
854–55, 879–87 (2004).
24 See OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 293–94 (1881) (tracing the “bargain” theory of
contracts).
25 Just how much copyright protection spurs creativity is an empirical question. The fashion
industry stands as an example of innovation without serious protection. Many expressive
elements in automobile design also fall into this category. Obviously, a great deal of creative
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Even if some copyright protection is necessary, there appears to be no
empirical evidence linking the production of creative works to a specific level of
copyright protection. This is not to say that artists whose livelihoods depend
on their efforts do not depend on copyright. The question is how much they
care about the precise terms of the bargain. It is unlikely that decisions to
approach their easels or word processors are directly related to whether the
period of protection is life plus fifty years or longer.
When copyright is compared to contract, these factors combine to remove
any element of a bargain on behalf of the public and two types of contractual
errors stand out. One deals with opportunistic infringement actions, the other
with the granting of market power.
A. OPPORTUNISTIC COPYRIGHT AND CLAIMS OF INFRINGEMENT

The opportunistic possibility occurs when an author would have produced
the item in the absence of copyright, if copyright existed for a much shorter
period, or when the work barely passes the minimum standard of a modicum of
creativity. The authors have what is, in effect, a windfall copyright—protection
that is well beyond that necessary to allow any anticipated period of
internalization. Two costs emerge in these situations. First, the windfall
copyright owner may in fact collect royalties. Second, it may institute
infringement actions which, successful or not, generate public costs.
An excellent example of how these costs can be generated is Beaudin v. Ben
and Jerry’s Homemade, Inc.26 There the manufacturers of hats with the familiar
black and white blotches of Holstein cows brought an infringement action
against the ice cream makers when it was discovered that the ice cream makers
had begun selling their own line of cow blotch hats. The decision went against
the plaintiffs but resulted in the initial trial court proceedings and an appeal to
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.27 The court ruled that there was no
substantial similarity between the two lines of hats.28 The decision itself is
sound, but the question from the perspective of contract law is why an
expectation is created in the first place that one could monopolize a type of
expression that is hardly original in any socially beneficial sense. Plus, why

effort is put forth by those not expecting compensation. Copyright is also likely to be irrelevant
when the value of a work is determined by who created it and not by anything intrinsic to the
work itself. For example, the most insignificant doodle by Picasso would be highly valued
whether copyrighted or copyrightable. In these cases it is not the expression that counts but the
person making the expression.
26 95 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 1996).
27 Id. at 2.
28 Id.
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should the disposition of a dispute about a trivial and artificially created
property interest be subsidized by the public?
Similar in effect is Sherry Manufacturing Co. v. Towel King,29 a case that
went through an appeal on the merits and returned on the issue of attorney’s
fees.30 Here the seller of what can only be viewed as the kitschiest of beach
towels was concerned that it had allowed its design to pass into the public
domain.31 Consequently, it created a derivative work that it viewed as
copyrightable as a way of protecting the original.32 It soon found that a
competitor was using the same or a similar design and filed an infringement
action.33 The court eventually ruled that the derivative work did not contain
enough originality to be copyrightable, and, thus, there was no infringement.34
Nevertheless, when viewed through the lens of contract these are instances in
which a poor bargain struck by the government led to even greater costs that
those normally associated with exclusivity.
It seems doubtful that in either of these cases or in scores of others that the
contract made, or that the author believes has been made, generated anything
beneficial for the public at all. In some instances, the work would have been
available without consideration. In both instances costs are generated for those
the agent represents without an offsetting gain.
B. GRANTS OF MONOPOLY POWER

In the second group of cases, copyright and infringement actions are not
opportunistic as described above because these works might not exist without a
solid foundation of exclusivity. First, it must be noted that exclusivity is not the
same as market or monopoly power.35 To understand why copyright does not
guarantee that an author has monopoly power one only has to think of
unpublished manuscripts, child drawings, and everyday snapshots. All are likely
copyrightable but cannot be sold at anything but a pittance. Nevertheless, in

753 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1985).
Sherry Manufacturing Co. v. Towel King, 822 F.2d 1031 (11th Cir. 1987).
31 Towel King, 753 F.2d at 1565.
32 Id. at 1566.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 1569.
35 Monopoly involves a single seller of a good or service for which there are no good
substitutes. Sometimes the term “market power” and “monopoly power” are both used to
indicate the ability to raise prices above competitive levels. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY
L. HARRISON, ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 27–29 (6th ed. 2013). Mere
exclusivity does not guarantee market or monopoly power when there is little or no demand for a
work.
29
30
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many instances, copyright does create market or monopoly power.36 Wellknown authors, celebrities, and their publishers may become wealthy not
because of their writing, per se, but because of the exclusivity they receive in the
copyright bargain. In these instances, exclusivity can be viewed as the grant of a
franchise not unlike like that granted to a utility. The difference is that the grant
of exclusivity to a utility includes a promise by the utility to make services
generally available at a price that will generate a normal profit.37 On the other
hand, in most copyright cases,38 the grant of the franchise does not limit the
ability of the owner to exploit the franchise. It is paradoxical that a type of
property that exists solely because the public permits it can then be used for
profit maximizing purposes.
In many but not all instances39 in which great wealth is at stake, the need and
likely willingness to pay for copyright protection is very strong. Yet, under U.S.
copyright law it is given away regardless of the willingness and ability of authors
to pay. In other contractual settings, the desire for something and the ability to
pay means higher prices are charged. In fact, copyright can be analogized to a
form of privacy which is, in its own way, exclusivity. Those who value privacy
very highly pay more to achieve it. Those for whom copyright is highly
profitable are also likely to be willing and able to pay for exclusivity. Other than
the transaction costs avoided by not requiring individual copyright negotiations,
there appears to be no public benefit derived from not charging for copyright
on the bases of willingness and ability to pay. Obviously this theory runs into
practical limitations, but broad categories of charges could be developed. For
example, one possibility is to grant copyright as it is done now but enact a
surtax on those who generate profit by virtue of copyright.
If there is no charge, an alternative is to decrease what is granted, perhaps in
the form of a shorter duration for highly profitable works. It is difficult to
believe that John Grisham, for example, would put his pen down if the period
of protection were life plus twenty-five years. In fact, the opposite may be the
case: A shorter duration may mean a greater incentive to be productive. In
36 The importance of copyright in advancing monopoly or market power is complex. For
example, in some instances the monopoly power is derived from the identity of the author.
Insignificant scribbles by Picasso would instantly have market to monopoly power without
copyright. On the other hand, the power of a novelist, no matter how renowned, is likely
dependent on copyright because, except in the case of the original manuscript, the desirable part
of the work can be infinitely copied.
37 See generally THOMAS COTTER & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS: POSITIVE,
NORMATIVE, AND BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVES 600–01 (West Academic Publishing 3d ed. 2013).
38 The obvious exceptions are “fair use” and instances of compulsory licensing.
39 The exceptions are instances in which the identity of the author is the primary source of
value attributed to the work and the work exists in single or limited numbers. Painting and
sculptures would fit this description.
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sum, the copyright contract can be seen to be like any other government
contract. Presumably the goal when purchasing weapons, roads, or space ships
is to bargain in order achieves the most cost efficient outcome for citizens. In
the context of copyright as contract, this means paying the least amount
necessary acquire the benefits to the public from the creative effort. In
copyright, though, the grant may mean simply mean higher prices.
III. THE BREACH
If the concept of copyright as contract is to hold there must be some place
for the idea of a breach. There are a number of possibilities here, but two stand
out. The first is that an infringement can be viewed as a breach without
straining the analysis too far. If the public is viewed as one of the contracting
parties, then the government as agent is promising exclusivity on its behalf.
When an infringement occurs, so the argument goes, one of the principals in
the contract has breached a promise made through the agent.40 As will be seen
below, more critical than whether an infringement is viewed as a breach, is the
question of the remedy for the breach. That discussion will be reserved for
later but is made more compelling by noting that an infringement is simply a
broken promise that is made by the public to an author.
More interesting is the question of a breach by an author.41 In this instance,
it is useful to think again of the obligation of the author as a party to the
copyright contract. An author can be said to promise to supply something that
complies with the requirements for copyright whenever he or she claims to be
entitled to copyright exclusivity. Thus, by including copyright notice,
registering, or bringing an action for infringement, the author purports to have
held up his or her end of the bargain. The least this can mean is that the work
is original and reflects a modicum of creativity. There are a number of ways for
a breach to occur, and all are complicated by the fact that copyright notice is
not currently required for a work to be protected.42
40 This would be, of course, the promise of exclusivity made on behalf of the public.
Interesting, if the principal/agent analogy is expanded, the retroactive extension of contract could
be viewed as a breach between the public and its agent. For example, the movement from
duration of life plus fifty to life plus seventy could be said to be breaking a promise to the public
that works would enter the public domain at life plus fifty.
41 Although this will seem like a foreign notion to many readers, the drafters of the Copyright
Act were clearly aware of the possibility that copyright might appear to cover more than it
legitimately can cover as far as exclusivity. See 17 U.S.C. § 403.
42 Under the Berne Convention standards, no formalities may be required for an author to
have copyright protection. See Berne Convention, supra note 10 (article 5 reads as follows: “The
enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality; such enjoyment
and such exercise shall be independent of the existence of protection in the country or origin of
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It is possible that the author may in fact have no reasonable belief that the
work for which copyright is claimed actually is an original43 work containing a
modicum of creativity.44 As has been described in detail by Jason Mazzone,
inaccurate claims of copyright are pervasive and costly.45 In effect, if one
pushed the contract analogy just an extra step, the authors have delivered
nonconforming goods. These nonconforming “goods” can have more serious
consequences than the usual case in which the buyer may simply respond by
covering in the market.46 In the context of copyright, discovery of
nonconformity may be difficult and the consequence of not delivering what was
promised may be that people are discouraged from using a work that by any
standard is available to them already because it is not copyrightable.
Nonconforming works (to use the terminology of contract law) are not just
those that lack originality and a modicum of creativity. Nonconformity also
follows when the merger doctrine renders the work uncopyrightable.47 In
addition, claims of copyright when a work was not renewed, as was once

the work. Consequently, apart from the provisions of this Convention, the extent of protect, as
well as the means of redress afforded to the author protect his rights, shall be governed
exclusively by the laws of the county where protection is claimed.”).
Under U.S. law copyright notice may be included. 17 U.S.C. §§ 401–402. It is important to
note that Section 403 limits the right to include notice in certain cases: Thus, under section 403,
sections 401 and 402
shall not apply to a work published in copies or phonorecords consisting
predominantly of one or more works of the United States Government unless
the notice of copyright appearing on the published copies or phonorecords to
which a defendant in the copyright infringement suit had access includes a
statement identifying, either affirmatively or negatively, those portions of the
copies or phonorecords embodying any work or works protected under this
title.
43 This would flow naturally if an “author” simply copied a previously existing work.
44 This would be a somewhat more difficult determination for an author to make. Similarly,
the holding out of a work as copyrightable that is not because of merger is more difficult for the
author to anticipate. See supra note 38. In the first instance of knowingly copying, the idea of
fraud is probably more appropriate than in these instances.
45 JASON MAZZONE, COPYFRAUD AND OTHER ABUSES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 9–
25 (2011). See also Jason Mazzone, CopyFraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026 (2006) [hereinafter
Mazzone, CopyFraud]; Jason Mazzone, Curbing CopyFraud, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 993
(2012).
46 U.C.C. § 2-712.
47 Merger occurs when the expression of an idea cannot be meaningfully separated from the
idea itself. Since copyright does not extend to ideas, the expression is not copyrightable. Thus,
under section 102(b) of the Copyright Act: “In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.”
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required,48 or which have otherwise entered the public domain also amount to
failure to deliver what was promised.
The contract law comparison is difficult when it comes to breach by an
author for two reasons. First, it is possible that an author has no intention to
enter into the copyright contract and will not claim an infringement has
occurred. The problem is that, in the absence of a notice requirement, it can be
difficult to know if an author is a party to the copyright contract. Since it will
not be clear, a potential user of the work may believe it is protected and, thus,
refrain from using a work that is available. In any case, the costs to the public
of this uncertainty can hardly be viewed as the result of a breach by an author.
A second possibility occurs when an author mistakenly but innocently
claims to have copyright protection but the work does not qualify because it
lacks originality, creativity, or is subject to the merger doctrine. These authors
will lose any infringement suits they file. However, that hardly addresses the
breach of contract issue because the damages are in the form of the chilling
effect on the use of copyrighted works by others who did have a legitimate right
to use the work but believed otherwise. It may seem harsh to apply sanctions in
these instances but it is useful to remember that contract law itself is essentially
a strict liability regime in which excuses for nonperformance are relatively rare.49
In addition, infringement, with some exceptions for the type of remedy,50 also
amounts to strict liability. Thus, any incorrect assertion that one has a right to
exclusivity is, in essence, a breach when the author does not deliver what was
promised regardless of fault.
This assignment of liability is in accord with assumption of the risk as
applied in contract law. In that context, the party who assumes the risk of nonperformance is still held liable even if the inability to perform is due to
circumstances over which he or she has no control. In copyright it seems
obvious that the party claiming to have a right to exclusivity is in a better
position to assume the risk of whether that claim is valid. It is difficult to see
the party claiming a copyright that turns out not to be valid as having
encountered something unexpected, as would be the case for excuse in
contract. Even if that were the case, the party claiming copyright is almost

Many works entered copyright prior to the 1976 Act. Until 1992 these works required renewal
to qualify for a second copyright term. In 1992 renewal of the second term became automatic. Of
course, none of this applied to works prepared after 1977 because those works are subject to a
unitary term.
49 Excuse for nonperformance of a contract is typically granted when the unexpected occurs
and the party requesting to be excused has not assumed the risk of the event. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Ch. (1981).
50 Statutory remedies distinguish infringement from willful infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 504.
48
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certainly in a better position to assume the risk that his or her work is not
original, does not include a modicum of creativity, or may merge with an idea.
A more difficult question arises when a party claiming to own a copyright is
met with a successful fair use defense. One view to take is that an unsuccessful
effort to defeat a fair use claim is also breach. In a sense the author is claiming
to own more than he or she does. There is no similar doctrine in contract law.
Plus, in terms of the contract analogy described here, there has been no breach.
The author must have complied with the promise to provide a copyrightable
work that would have been infringed or the fair use defense would not be
invoked. In effect, fair use arises when the author claims the contract has been
beached by someone else. In sum, although there are similarities, it does not
appear that a suit that fails because of a fair use defense is the equivalent of a
breach. On the other hand, an argument that fair use does not apply which is
not colorable under the facts or law may result in sanctions under Rule 11.51
IV. REMEDIES
It is difficult to separate questions of breach from those of the appropriate
remedy. Two possible breaches are described—infringement and the incorrect
or fraudulent claim of copyright. Copyright law treats the remedial issues in the
context of the first breach in depth.52 The discussion that follows demonstrates
that the treatment is inconsistent with contract law but, more importantly,
inconsistent with copyright policy. First, however, the intriguing question of a
proper response to breach by the author is addressed.
A. THE AUTHOR’S BREACH

If a party has paid for the right to use a work when none was necessary, one
can readily rely on the contract notion of reliance53 to calculate a recovery.54
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 11.
17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (“The principal remedy is as follows: The copyright owner is entitled to
recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits
of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in
computing the actual damages. In establishing the infringer’s profits, the copyright owner is
required to present proof only of the infringer’s gross revenue, and the infringer is required to
prove his or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than
the copyrighted work.”).
In addition, authors may be entitled to statutory damages in lieu of subsection (b) damages.
17 U.S.C. § 504(c). Section 502 allow for injunctive relief. Id. § 502.
53 Restitution would be equally effective.
54 In contract law, the reliance recovery places the non-breaching party in the position he or
she would have been in had the contract not been formed. A party who pays for the use of a
work unnecessarily comparable to a party who had entered into a contract unnecessarily.
51
52
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This, however, is hardly fully consistent with a more comprehensive contractbased approach to copyright. Although individuals may have paid unnecessary
licensing fees, the broader contract is between the author and the general
public—not simply one member of the public.55 In addition, the basic contract
remedy is expectancy—the difference in value between what was promised and
what was received. Thus, ideally, each author who breaches the contract would
be assessed the difference in value between what was actually produced and the
value of what was promised. If the work is not copyrightable then the value of
what was produced is, for copyright purposes, zero. The problem with the
determination of damages lies on the other side of the calculation in that it is
impossible to ascertain the value of a work that did not exist. All we know is
that it would have met some relatively modest standard for creativity.
In these instances there is an imperfect substitute for actual damages and
one that carries with it a small helping of poetic justice. If the author is rational,
we know that he or she would not invest more in producing a work, registering
it, and in litigating any supposed infringement than its possible value. The sum
of these is a floor on what the author purports the value of the work to be to
the public. It is, at least, a beginning point for an assessment of the value of
what was promised. If the work is not copyrightable—the work delivered has
no value—then the damages are equal to that anticipated value.56
While a possible for expectancy, this measure would not account for the
value to the public once the work enters the public domain and it would not
account for instances in which parties did not use a work that they had a right
to use and possibly, therefore, turned to less satisfactory substitutes. Thus, it
may be useful in the case of a breach of the author to depart from contract law
and consider an element of punitive damages.57 One of the rationales for
punitive damages in tort law and even criminal law is the sense that not every
person who is guilty of a wrong is actually discovered and must pay. In other
words, the full externality caused by the tort or criminal act would not be fully
internalized if only single damages were paid. The key to punitive damages is to
raise the expected cost to others who may engage in the same wrong. Almost
certainly not all breaching authors will be discovered and, thus, it makes sense
to add a punitive element to damages assessed against those who are.
It is obvious that a critical issue in instances in which plaintiffs are other
than individuals who have unnecessarily paid licensing fees is who would have
standing. In these instances the connection between the breach and single

In effect, this remedy would be in addition to refunding any fees paid by individuals.
This is simply the difference between what was promised and what was delivered.
57 It is noteworthy that although punitive damages are not part of standard contract law,
statutory remedies for copyright infringement do have a punitive element. 17 U.S.C. § 504.
55
56
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individuals would be difficult to isolate. It would likely also be difficult to
define the proper member of a class.58 This argues for a more public approach
like those available to the Justice Department or the Federal Trade Commission
in the case of antitrust.59 Almost certainly the best option is a statute that
includes a significant penalty for a false copyright claim.60 When it comes to
infringers, the act allows for some flexibility with respect to the knowledge of
the infringer.61 This same pattern makes sense in the case of a false claim of
copyright. In addition, the statutory approach would be consistent with other
provisions found in the Act.
The lack of a requirement that an author provide notice or even register a
work means that breaches by authors are even more difficult to address. In
fact, without some form of notice requirement, it is difficult to fashion a
meaningful remedy that would approach the ideal.62 In particular, those who
understand that notice is not necessary for a work to be copyrightable may not
use works for fear of infringement claims when none is likely or successful.
Thus, some form of an obvious declaration that the author is claiming to own
the work is necessary but not sufficient to an effective remedial system. As it
stands now, copyright law holds little promise for curtailing authors’ breaches.
Even if there were a notice requirement, there is little to discourage authors
from making false claims of copyright.
One line of cases that initially seems useful is that dealing with copyright
misuse. Some courts have found that misuse of copyright is a bar to a recovery
for infringement.63 It has been suggested that this could be extended to include
efforts to enforce copyright when the plaintiff is actually not entitled to
copyright.64 Although this line of cases may seem to give hope for a judicial
development of some kind of response to breaches by authors, further
development seems unlikely. The misuse cases involve instances in which the
author has a copyright but uses that leverage to exact something extra from a
licensee. The cases do not involve a response to the problem of mislabeling
and the analysis seems to track that of antitrust. The improper claim of
copyright cases damages go well beyond those that would fall in the ambit of

FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
See, e.g., MAZZONE, supra note 45, at ch. 8.
60 In the case of private actions, this would be consistent with punitive damages.
61 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
62 A possible response is discussed in text accompanying infra notes 148–50.
63 See, e.g., Lasercomb Am. Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990). But see BellSouth
Adver. & Pub’g Corp. v. Donnelley Information Pub’g Inc., 933 F.2d 952 (11th Cir. 1991);
Metro. Reg’l Info. Systems, Inc. v. Am. Home Realty Network, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 2d 691 (D. Md.
2012).
64 See Mazzone, CopyFraud, supra note 45, at 1087–89 (suggesting the possibility).
58
59
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using leverage and although these cases are consistent with good policy, they are
unrelated to the problem of the author’s breach.
B. BREACH BY THE PUBLIC

1. Property or Liability Rules? A breach by a member of the public is somewhat
more complicated in part because the Act includes a comprehensive approach to
the remedies for breach. The current remedial system is, however, misguided
from virtually any perspective. The beginning point for understanding this is the
seminal 1976 Article, “One View of the Cathedral”65 by Guido Calibresi and
Douglas Melamed. In that article the authors distinguish property rules and
liability rules as methods of protecting rights. Liability rules, like those applied in
a negligence case, require the party causing the harm to compensate injured
parties for damages in order to restore them to pre-damage conditions.66
Property rules, on the other hand, are those that require the permission of the
party before his or her rights may be affected. This is typically the case when one
party would like to acquire the property of another. Thus, one may damage the
property of another through negligence and pay damages but one may not take
the property without consent.67
Although the standard remedies in cases of copyright are monetary, the
regime works like a property rule.68 Infringers are liable for any damage caused
by the infringement and must disgorge any profits resulting from the use of the
protected work. The idea is to eliminate incentives to infringe by eliminating all
benefits.69 Consequently, the potential infringer would be better off by
negotiating with the copyright owner because at least part of the profit resulting
from an otherwise infringing use of the copyrighted work could be retained.
If the contracts model were adopted, the standard remedy would be
damages only. Thus, when assessing the remedy for infringement, the question
65 Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Rules of Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
66 See id. at 1105–11 (it is important to note that the compensation is actually a means to
require the party doing the harm to internalize the costs of that harm. For those concerned with
efficient outcomes, this internalization is more important than actual compensation.).
67 Id. (noting that liability rules are more appropriate when transaction costs are high—the
parties would likely be unable to bargain with each other but those causing the harm should
internalize the damage caused. When transaction costs are low, it is preferable for reasons of
efficiency for the parties to bargain. To some extent property rules are backed by punitive
measures including criminal sanctions.).
68 In the case of injunctive relief, copyright remedies have a direct property rule effect.
69 This would be in contrast to the “efficient infringement” in which a party might find an
unexploited use for the work and pay damages to the author of the work and still profit. This has
been explored by at least one scholar, David Fangundes, Efficient Copyright Infringement, 98 IOWA L.
REV. 1791 (2013) and one court, Walker v. Forbes, Inc., 28 F.3d 408 (4th Cir. 1994).
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is: why should copyright deviate from the standard contract remedy. More
precisely, given that property rules give rise to transaction costs, is there some
justification for incurring those costs? As it turns out, and as the following
demonstrates, there is no public policy basis for applying the property rule and
a number of reasons why it should not be applied.70 Before beginning the
analysis, it is important to be clear that, under a liability rule in copyright, like
that in contract law, the author would be entitled to full compensation including
any lost profits resulting from an infringement of his or her work that are
reasonably foreseeable.71 The argument for a liability rule involves two steps.
The first is that the usual concerns about property rules do not apply to
copyright. The second is that property rules, especially in the context of poorly
defined rights, drive up the cost of the copyright regime.
2. The Arguments For and Against Property and Liability Rules.
a. The Preference for Property Rules. The preference for property rules stems
from three basic concerns: autonomy, efficiency, and distributive outcomes, all
of which can be understood in the context of a simple example. Suppose you
drive by a house and outside is parked a sleek sports car that you feel you must
have. If a liability rule is applied, you could simply take the car and leave, in its
place, a sum of money equal to its fair market value.72 This is comparable to an
infringement in which the infringer is only required to pay the loss of the
author.
The first concern is that, as a matter of principle, there may be a preference
for consent as a way to preserve the autonomy of the owner of the car.73 This
concern is relatively easy to understand. The second concern is efficiency-based
and requires some background. From the standpoint of efficiency, exchanges
that leave both parties better off are preferable for obvious reasons.74 In this
70 In effect the question is less about efficient infringement than it is about which rule
advances the aim of copyright law at the lowest cost.
71 Contract law typically does not provide for punitive damages. This makes sense from an
economic perspective because, unlike torts and other areas of law, harms do not go unnoticed. In
copyright, however, infringements may go unnoticed and thus the habitual infringer may not fully
internalize the harm caused. Copyright law allows for this to some extent by the availability of
statutory damages, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c), but a more comprehensive regime of punitive damages
may be warranted. The purpose, however, is not to compensate the plaintiff nor to disgorge
profits made, as the property rule does, but to ensure the infringing party internalizes the harm
caused.
72 Taking the car as opposed to a consensual exchange amounts to changing a property rule to
a liability rule. Calabresi and Mademed note that criminal law can be explained in part by a desire
to prevent this from happening. Calabresi & Malemed, supra note 65, at 1124–27.
73 In a high transaction cost context the value attributed to consent may have to be weighed
against the possibility that nonconsensual transfer would have occurred but for the transaction costs.
74 This is an application of the notion of Pareto Superiority, a concept in welfare economics that
describes a particular measure of efficiency. See COTTER & HARRISON, supra note 37, at 45–46.
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example, though, we cannot know if the owner of the car would have sold it for
the market value. Market value is simply an average. The owner might have
demanded more, not simply as a way of getting the highest price possible but
also because without that higher price he or she would feel worse off.
Moreover, it is a context—low transaction costs—in which the parties could
have negotiated to discover if there was a price that left them both better off.75
In the context of efficiency concerns, it makes sense to think in terms of
false positives and false negatives. A transaction that does not take place but
which would have been beneficial is a false negative. When transaction costs
are high, the possibility of false negatives increases. An exchange that takes
place that is not ultimately beneficial76 can be viewed as a false positive.
Involuntary exchanges—like the theft, even with payment—run the risk of
being false positives. A transfer does occur but it leaves at least one party worse
off. Thus, voluntary exchanges, like those under property rules, avoid the false
positive problem but because of transactions costs may lead to false negatives.
To understand the third concern, change the hypothetical and assume the
person taking the car does leave $5,000, which is its market value. Further
assume he or she takes it because he has a found a buyer for that particular car
for $10,000. In effect, he or she profits as a consequence of the “theft.” Some
people, particularly the owner of the car, will feel that justice requires some
sharing of the profit from its resale. Economists label this a distributive matter
because it does not concern allocation of the car to its most valued use, only
who ends up richer. That does not, however, render it unimportant.77 Thus,
under a liability rule, not only is there a risk that the owner is worse off, but the
owner does not share in the profit associated with the resale. In sum, the three
possible objections listed above to liability rules can be seen as dealing with
three pervasive concerns of law: autonomy, efficiency, and distributive fairness.

The efficiency concern can be viewed as involving false positives and false negatives as
found in antitrust law. A false negative occurs when a practice is not condemned even though it
is on balance anticompetitive. A false positive is the result of condemning an activity that actually
may be beneficial in terms of consumer welfare or efficiency more generally.
There is also a notion of transactional false positives and false negatives. Transactions that
do not occur but which would make both parties better off are false negatives. A false positive is
an exchange, likely nonconsensual, that leaves at least one party worse off. 3 PHILIP AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW § 651, at 96–97 (3d ed. 2008).
76 Technically, as long as one party is better off the outcome is efficient even if the position of
the second party remains unchanged.
77 In economics, allocative matters are those that increase or decrease total wealth.
Distributive matters concern how wealth is divided up. The classical supposition is that
economics, as a science, cannot evaluate distributive questions since they involve interpersonal
comparison of utility.
75
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b. Why the Objections to Liability Rules Do Not Apply in Copyright. To
understand why these objections lose their validity in the context of copyright,
it is important to focus on what copyright law actually is intended to do. As
already noted,78 the long and universally held view is that U.S. copyright law is
utilitarian—it is an instrument the government implements to increase overall
wellbeing. The means to this end is to grant exclusivity that bars the use by
others to those who create expressive works. This exclusivity is the cost to the
public of having the work available.79 It is comparable to a tax that is passed on
to members of the public. In this context that tax should be no greater than the
minimum needed to achieve the ends sought.80
Now return to concerns about liability rules and take them not quite in the
order listed above. The efficiency concern is that payment of damages may
result in inefficient infringements—false positives—because it would be
unknown whether the author would have voluntarily exchanged the use of the
work for the damages caused to the work by its use by others.81 Before going
further it is important to remember that damages here would include any loss in
value of the work. This loss in value would include an amount equal to the
discounted present value of any profits the author expected to make.82 In a
general way, one might say it is the decrease in the value of the income earning
asset (the work) due to the infringement. The only way for the liability rule to
result in an inefficiency is if the author would not have sold for that price or
were not at least indifferent between selling at that price and not selling at all.83
In these instances the author would have to possess an attachment to the
work that is excess of market value. There are two possible explanations for an
See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
See William Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 325 (1989).
80 Landes and Posner note that copyright law should maximize the difference between the
benefits of creating additional works and the costs (including losses from limited access) of
protecting the works. They state this in terms of maximizing the benefit of the costs and benefits
of additional works. This is probably incorrectly stated because it maximizes the gain from
marginal output which would stop protection at levels short of the social welfare maximizing
level.
81 In other words there is a danger of “false positives.” As an economic matter, the idea of
compensating through damages is more related to the Kaldor-Hicks or wealth maximizing
standard of efficiency. Under that measure, it is not necessary that the author actually be
compensated as long as the gains to the infringer were enough that the author could be fully
compensated. See COTTER & HARRISON, supra note 37, at 51–52.
82 To be sure, the entire analysis is somewhat awkward if it is true that those claiming damages
had no cognitive connection to copyright when creating their works.
83 In reality, there may be series of prices at which the hypothetical exchange would have taken
place. These prices exist along what is called a contract curve. For example, if the lowest an
author would accept is $1 and the most the secondary user would pay is $5, a contract curve
exists between $1 and $5. Each point along that curve would leave both parties better off.
78
79
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attachment in excess of market value. First, an author, fully aware of the
property rule, knows that he or she can use market power to hold out for more
than the actual loss suffered. Second, the author may have some subjective
vision about how the work should be used which would not be reflected in loss
earnings.
Taking these in turn, if an author would not sell because he or she realizes
the property rule allows him to hold on to his work for more than fair market
value, it does not mean that the liability rule creates the inefficiency. The
liability rule accounts for the value of any exclusivity the author could expect
and the value of the exclusivity that resulted in creation of the work. In effect,
the property rule grants monopoly power that allows the author to bargain for a
better distributive outcome. Eliminating the monopoly power of the author is
not a form of inefficiency. Moreover, whatever power is granted to the author
is actually inconsistent with the central goal of copyright as an instrument of a
utilitarian policy. In effect, the property rule allows the author to raise the price
beyond that which he or she agreed to when entering into the “copyright
contract.”
What about the possibility of subjective attachment or sentimental values?
In the context of contract or tort law and liability rules, this is the usual
objection. For example, in contract, whatever was bargained for was of greater
value to the buyer than market value. In copyright, this would mean attributing
some special importance to a work or wanting to control the use to which it
might be put. This is not an unrealistic possibility.84 Any effort to protect that
preference, though, is comparable to protecting moral rights,85 something that
is rejected, with very limited exception, by the Copyright Act.86 Expecting or
demanding payment in excess of damages suggests the author believes,
incorrectly, that his or her personal preferences are to be taken into
consideration when determining what uses may be made of the work. But this
is not the case in copyright law, as attested to by instances in which permission
for payment has been rejected and the work is used anyway.87 Indeed, the
issues of subjective objections by authors have long been subordinated by
virtue of fair use that allows for parody and ridicule.88 The reality is that
personal preferences about use are not among the rights granted by copyright.
This objection could rise to the level at which no amount of compensation would be
adequate to satisfy the author or to some level at which the author could put aside his or her
scruples for a price.
85 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
86 The principal exception is the Visual Artists Rights Act found in section 106A of the
Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 106a (2012).
87 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
88 Id.
84
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In short, in copyright, the possibility of false positives is slim even under a
liability rule. If anything, the property rule raises the risk of false negatives in
that it permits the copyright owner to prevent exchanges that would be
efficient89 and allows authors to assert moral rights when they are not part of
what was granted under the Act.
If a liability rule in copyright results in no inefficiency, what about the other
two possible objections: distributive outcomes and autonomy? On the first
point, the right to a share of the profit for uses not anticipated by the author
when the work was created means deviating from the bargain or contract
principle the Supreme Court has attached to copyright.90 When authors ask for
and receive profits from infringing they receive economic rents. These are
payments in excess of the amount necessary to make the copyright holder
whole and, thus, in excess of the amount necessary to produce the work. The
right to bargain over these rents raises transaction costs and reduces the
likelihood an exchange will take place.
To many, this will seem like a fair trade-off. Higher transaction costs mean
fewer exchanges but an increased likelihood that the author will share in the
profit from reuse. The problem is that whatever appeal this tradeoff holds is
based on a misconception of what the author has been granted. The Copyright
Act does grant exclusivity but it does not grant monopoly or market power.
The author attempting to leverage this right of exclusivity into a share of the
profit asks for something that is not promised under the terms of the copyright
contract. In fact, in other instances of government grants of exclusivity the
owners are not entitled to assert monopoly or market power.91 For example,
one of the characteristics of government created exclusivity in other contexts is
that the exclusivity may not be used to exact rents or monopoly profits.92 There
is no principled distinction between those instances and copyright. In copyright
exclusiveness is granted to the extent the public benefits. The property right,

Not only may authors block efficient licensing by demanding more than a compensatory
payment, the rule also creates the danger of bilateral monopoly. Bilateral monopoly exists when
there is a single buyer and a single seller. Haggling over the best deal is a costly process that could
eventually result in no exchange at all. See Walgreen v. Sara Creek Property Co., 966 F.2d 273
(7th Cir. 1992).
90 See cases cited at note 90, supra. But see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (concerning
the Constitutionality of retroactive extension of copyright duration, the argument was made that
it involved a change in the contract already made between authors and the government.
Curiously, the Supreme Court demurred with respect to this theory but noted that the contract
also included a promise of possible future extensions.).
91 Exclusivity in copyright includes no promise that an author will have market power. Market
power depends on whether there a reasonable substitutes available.
92 Economic rents are payments in excess of that amount necessary to draw a productive input
into use.
89
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and the ability to extract profits made by others, extends that grant beyond what
is necessary for the public benefit. It seems counterintuitive to create property
for the benefit of the public and then allow the owner of that property to earn
monopoly profits from that property through the use of property rule
protection. Plus, the liability rule already protects any reasonably expected
profits.
Finally, some may object to liability rules because they allow for taking the
property of another without permission. Rather than a monetized value, the
sense may be that liability rules do not respect individual autonomy. This is an
appealing argument but must rest on a view that the author believes what is
taken is his or hers in the first place. This notion seems unrealistic in the
context of a statute that has multiple exemptions, a fair use defense, and a
battery of compulsory licenses. Because of all these possibilities, a distinction
between a crashed car and the stolen car described at the outset comes into
play. In both instances, rights are violated without consent. The driver of the
car, though, can be said to have consented or assumed the risk that there will be
car accidents. Or, put differently, his or her car may be taken without
permission. The copyright holder is in a comparable position. He or she
knows that there are a variety of ways in which a work may be taken without
permission. Plus, there are a host of other exemptions93 for would-be infringers
most of which, like fair use,94 can only be anticipated at a very general level.
Many of those uses may be repugnant to the author, but that is of no
consequence. The point is that any expectation of someone holding a
copyright, like the driver of a car, that takings will only occur with permission
would be unrealistic and uninformed. All authors assume the risks of
nonconsensual transfers. Having agreed to the terms of the copyright contract,
it is disingenuous to claim a lack of consent to involuntary uses.
3. The Property Rule in the Context of Copyright. The considerations examined
above are important enough, when they hold, to find a liability rule
unobjectionable and more consistent with the purported role of copyright law.
This would be the extent of the argument if property rules were neutral in terms
of promoting copyright policy. They are not and, thus, the argument for a
liability rule is stronger when the costs of the property rule are examined.
a. Transaction Costs. The transaction cost based objections to property
rules can be seen to exist at two levels. First, the cost of making the exchange
happen may exceed the benefits of the exchange. The extent to which there are
transaction costs is a case by case empirical determination. Whether those costs
93 The Copyright Act is riddled with exemptions—far too many to include in a footnote. For
examples see sections 107–114 of the Act.
94 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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then create false negatives is yet another inquiry. We do know that the costs
exist and it would be hard to fathom that they produce no false negatives.
Second, there are instances in which exchanges occur despite transaction costs.
This, however, does not alter the character of transaction costs themselves.
They are still a net loss to society because they do not actually result in the
production of anything. As the discussion above suggests, the avoidance of
liability rules in the context of copyright does not represent a compelling reason
to encourage and absorb transaction costs.95 In effect, the property rule not
only increases the probability of false negatives but increases the cost of correct
outcomes.
Even though it will be in many cases relatively easy for authors of works and
those who want permission to use a specific work to locate each other, the idea
that transaction costs are generally low is a false one. For example, one of the
more stubborn areas in which transaction costs come into play is with orphan
works—works that are under copyright but whose owners/authors are
unknown.96 Similarly, the provisions of the Act with respect to duration mean
that the owners of the copyright may be two generations removed from the
artist and, with or without registration, difficult to find.97 Further adding to this
problem are the complex terms in the Act with respect to when an author or his
or her heirs may terminate an existing assignment.98
In addition to these complications, the necessity of bargaining between the
author and the secondary user means that the user must have some knowledge
of copyright law. In particular, since no notice of copyright notice is currently
required,99 the party wishing to use a work would have to know that a work may
be protected even though there is no notice or registration. Even in the
simplest cases, the idea of anything approaching a friction-free environment in
which parties know that works may be protected and licenses are the result of
simple phone calls to readily available authors and simple negotiation is
farfetched.
95 Those reasons and their inapplicability of copyright remedies are discussed in the previous
section.
96 See generally Olive Huang, U.S. Copyright Office Orphan Works Inquiry: Finding Homes for the
Orphans, 21 BERK. TECH. L.J. 265 (2006); David R. Hansen, Kathryn Hashimoto, Gwen Hinze,
Pamela Samuelson & Jennifer M. Urban, Solving the Orphan Works Problem for the United States, 37
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (2013).
97 It is important to note that works need not be registered in order to be protected by
copyright law. See 17 U.S.C. § 408(a).
98 The 1976 Act created means by which heirs may terminate prior copyright assignments. See
17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c). For an example of the complexities that can arise see Siegel v. Warner
Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (Cal. 2008). Classic Media, Inc. v. Mewborn, 532 F.3d 978
(C.D. Cal. 2008).
99 See supra note 97.
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The burdens of a property rule, with respect to a wide range of transaction
costs, are increased when bilateral monopoly conditions exist. Bilateral
monopoly means there is a single buyer and a single seller. Economists100 and
others101 have long recognized that when a bilateral monopoly exists the parties
may both feel they have the power to establish a favorable price since they will
regard their counterpart as having few or no choices. This results in strategic
behavior that may lead to an impasse or a delay that is sufficiently long so that
the benefits from the transaction decline or disappear.102 This is not to say that
this is always the case in copyright. For example, a film production company
may view itself as having several choices with respect to a book to turn into a
film. Or, it may view itself having little choice in the context of a single
blockbusting best seller. The point is that there are always some transaction
costs when property rules are invoked; the potential for monopoly power and
bilateral monopoly conditions simply increase these costs. All of these factors
add to the likelihood of false negatives and make the property rule difficult to
justify especially in the context of a property right created to benefit the public
generally.
b. Bargaining Under Conditions of Uncertainty. Beyond standard transaction
costs, property rules are particularly cumbersome when conditions of
uncertainty exist. And, in copyright, uncertainty is the norm. For example,
when one party discovers the work of someone else that he or she would like to
use, there are a number of possibilities. First, the secondary user may use the
work without consequence because neither party understands the need for a
license. Second, the secondary party uses the work and both parties believe,
correctly or not, that the use is subject to one of the exemptions or defenses.
Third, the work is not used because the secondary party mistakenly believes it
would be too expensive and that the use would not fall within any the
exceptions or a fair use defense. Fourth, the work may not be used because the
parties are unable to agree on a licensing fee. Finally, the parties may be unable
to agree on a licensing fee, the work may be used, and an infringement action
may follow.103

See A.C. Pigou, Equilibrium Under Bilateral Monopoly, 18 ECON. J., no. 70, 2008, at 205; Roger
D. Blair, David L. Kaserman & Richard E. Romano, A Pedagogical Treatment of Bilateral Monopoly, 55
S. ECON. J., no. 4, 1989, at 831.
101 See Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Property Co., 966 F.2d 273 (1992); In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d
311 (7th Cir. Ind. 1996).
102 Id.; see also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY
AND THE LAW 39 (Harvard Univ. Press 1994).
103 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
100

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol22/iss2/2

26

Harrison: Copyright As Contract

2015]

COPYRIGHT AS CONTRACT

305

Outcomes three through five are undesirable and are largely a function of
combining a property rule with a system of imprecise property rights.104 To
understand this, consider the contrast between selling an automobile and selling
the right to use a copyrighted work. Most car sellers will have a title to the car
with a VIN number corresponding to that on the car. The age of the car, its
mileage and its general condition will be known to the buyer and seller. There
is likely to be little disagreement about what is owned or at least a general range
of possible values. In the case of copyright, though, multiple questions arising
from whether a work is original and contains a modicum of creativity,105 the
application of the merger doctrine,106 the application of various exemptions107
and fair use108 mean that what one owns by virtue of claiming a copyright is
unknown and perhaps unknowable. Possible changes in the duration of
copyright and possible termination rights create further uncertainty.109
The impact of imprecision on agreements can be understood by examining
the well-known analysis of settlements, another form of contract in which
transaction costs and uncertainty play a major role.110 As in copyright, a
settlement involves the purchase of a right. In both cases, the defendant buys
the plaintiff’s right to pursue the case in court. In fact, the purchase of the
license is in reality much like an ex ante settlement in that the author gives up a
right to protest the use of his or her work in the future. In most instances of
settlement, neither party will know the actual value of a case other than in terms
of an expected outcome. The greater the clarity in the law and facts, the more
likely it is that a settlement will occur because it increases the likelihood that the
parties will have consistent valuations.111

104 The first possibility cannot be traced to liability rules or property rules although it may mean
the law breaks down as far as compensating authors for their work.
105 This is likely to have impact on the value of the work. A work may be protected even if it
represents very little creativity. The question of what is protected and what is not may only be
known after an alleged infringement.
106 For examples of uncertainty relating to the issue of merger see Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99
(1880); Morrisey v. Procter & Gamble, Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
107 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–114.
108 The uncertainty of a fair use analysis is discussed below. See infra notes 123–35.
109 Copyright durations extended in 1978 and 1998, events unlikely to have been anticipated by
authors in the 1950s, likely increased the value of works created in that period.
110 See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD., no. 4, 1984, at 1 (explaining why some cases settle and others do not). But see
Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the
Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77 (1997) (discussing settlement with reference to behavioral economics),
See also John Bronsteen, Some Thoughts About the Economics of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1129
(2009) (discussing values implicated in the settlement process).
111 See Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517, 524,
557–58 (2014) (applying this argument to patent remedies).
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Consider this example: the amount at stake is $1,000 and both parties
estimate there is an even chance of a decision going either way; the expected
gain to plaintiffs is $500 minus attorney fees.112 For the defendant, the
expected loss is $500 plus attorney fees. In this example, assume attorney fees
are $100. The expected benefit to the plaintiff is $400 and any settlement
amount in excess of that will leave him or her better off. The expected loss to
the defendant is $600 and any settlement amount less than that will leave him or
her better off. The high likelihood of an agreement is obvious.113
Now change the analysis so the parties disagree on the facts or law. Perhaps
the law is evolving and neither party knows the next step or there is legislation
in the works that may affect their rights. Plaintiff believes he or she has a 80%
chance of prevailing, meaning an expected gain of $700. Defendant believes he
or she has an 80% chance of prevailing and, therefore views the case as
involving an expected loss of $300. Plaintiff will not accept less than $700 to
agree to settle and defendant will not pay more than $300. The outcome is no
agreement.
As noted, the purchase of a license is similar to a settlement in that it is a
contract made under conditions of uncertainty. The likelihood of an agreement
is decreased if there is uncertainty and the parties disagree on the value of what
is being purchased. In the context of licensing, this will often be the case. The
combination of a property rule with ill-defined property rights means works will
be exchanged less, and works will be generally less available to the public. This
is not to say compromise is not possible when property rights are uncertain, but
it is more likely when the rights are well-defined or at least the areas of
uncertainly can be isolated and some value of the risk agreed upon.
c. Sources of Uncertainty Under Copyright. The sources of imprecision in
copyright are myriad. Three are discussed here. The first is whether a work is
copyrighted at all. Next is the fair use problem. Finally, the property rule itself
creates uncertainty. Each of these illustrations makes use of cases drawn from
litigation, but these are only representative of a virtually limitless number of
examples.
4. Is There a Known Protectable Interest? This is in many respects the most
fundamental area of uncertainty in copyright. An author may include copyright
notice on the work and register it but, in fact, have nothing that is protectable.
Conversely, an author may include no notice and not register the work and have
a protectable interest.114 With no official indicia of copyright, the parties are
This is .5 times $1,000.
This is the simplest model of settlements. In reality, a number of other factors may work
against settlement. See JEFFREY L. HARRISON & JULES THEEUWES, LAW AND ECONOMICS 480–94
(2008).
114 Registration is required prior to an infringement action.
112
113
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likely to find themselves in the position of the nonsettling parties described
above. One party may see a simple work and conclude that it could not
possibly be copyrightable while the author may assume it is. No transaction will
take place and an infringement may occur depending upon, if a court considers
the matter, which party made the correct assumption.115 Even if the potentially
infringing party understands that permission may be needed, there is little
reason to approach the author who may be ignorant of the extent of his or her
rights because that supplies the potential seller with information he may not
have. In short, the best conditions for licensing occur when both parties have
roughly the same idea of value and both know the other party is likely to know
that value. In an area of law as ill-defined as copyright this is unlikely to
occur.116 Moreover, in a setting in which rights must be purchased,
approaching the owner of those rights with an offer may be avoided because it
suggests to the possibly ignorant seller that there is anything of value for which
he or she must be paid.
A number of simple cases illustrate the understandable uncertainty in
copyright. In Emanation Inc. v. Zomba Recording Inc.117 the works were six
supposedly Cajun statements that were played by pushing buttons on a plastic
device called “Cajun in Your Pocket” that featured six buttons.118 When the
defendant recorded a rap song using some of the same sayings, the
manufacturer of Cajun in Your Pocket claimed there had been an infringement.
Ultimately, the case came down to whether the sayings—“We gon pass a good
time, yeah, cher,” and “You gotta suck da head on dem der crawfish”—that
were repeated in the song “Shake Ya Ass” were original.119 The court held that
they were not and, thus, there was no infringement.120
Until that decision was made, however, there was no way for either party to
know whether the manufacturer of the Cajun in Your Pocket had anything to
sell. The plaintiff had registered the item, but that does not determine
copyrightabilty. It may have not occurred to the defendant that permission was
required. The defendant understandably will have little idea of what to offer for
something that may be free.121 But even if the defendant understood that the
Even this assumes both parties have a modest amount of knowledge about copyright.
The extreme opposite of this is the typical property rule case described above of purchasing
a car. They buyer will know he or she has no right to claim ownership in the car and the seller
will be equally sure of the ownership of the car. Making an offer to buy the car does not reveal
anything.
117 72 F. App’x 187 (2003).
118 Id.
119 Id. at 187–88.
120 Id. at 191.
121 In fact, the court held that the plaintiff’s worked lacked originality. Nor as noted below,
even if the parties had thought to bargain, they would be faced with virtually no way to know
115
116
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use might be an infringement and that the remedy could be the author’s
damages plus profit due to the infringement, neither party would be likely to
know where to even begin in terms of a negotiation. The author is likely to
have little understanding of the profit from infringement, and this is not
information the secondary user would be inclined to share. The secondary user
is unlikely to know what damages to the author would be. In a sense, the
poorly defined nature of the property interest and the divergence of views is
evidenced by the willingness not just to go to trial but to push the matter to
appeal.122 In many cases, there is nothing about the work, or its notice and
registration, that would signal to the secondary user that permission is required.
5. Fair Use. It is likely that the most perplexing and uncertainty-creating
element of copyright law is the defense of fair use. The test involves weighing
four factors, none of which are susceptible to definition except in vague terms.
Yet this test ultimately determines whether the property rule will be invoked or
not.
To understand the complexity and unpredictability of fair use, it is useful to
examine two cases involving celebrity artist Jeff Koons. In a 1992 case, Rogers v.
Koons,123 Koons made a sculpture depicting a photograph taken by Art
Rogers.124 The photograph was of two people sitting with several puppies. The
court described the puppies and the photograph as “charming.”125 Koons’
version, although clearly a copy, included a number of changes.126 He used the
sculpture in a show called “Banality” that was allegedly to illustrate how mass
production of media images reduce the quality of society.127 He claimed it was
a parodic work.128 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the argument,
noting that a parody required that “the copied work must be, at least in part, an
object of the parody. . . .”129 It also noted that the use presumptively had a
negative impact on the original by decreasing the likelihood that another
sculptor would buy the rights to create a three dimensional image of the
photo.130

what profits could be traced to the use of the work. Thus, even if they agree on likely liability,
uncertainty about the consequences would still be substantial.
122 The lower court had also held for the defendant.
123 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
124 Id. at 305, 308.
125 Id. at 304.
126 Id. at 308.
127 Id. at 304, 309.
128 Id. at 309.
129 The court evidently viewed parody and satire as falling into the same category. Id. at 309.
130 Id. at 311–12.
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Fourteen years later, in Blanch v. Koons,131 Koons returned to the Circuit
Court of Appeals with a similar case involving his use of another photograph.
This time he had copied an advertising photograph for an expensive pair of
women’s shoes. There was no sculpture or alternation but instead he digitally
scanned the original work and assembled it into a collage with others. The final
work showed four pairs of women’s legs with shoes on dangling over a variety
of desserts.132 There was, as in Rogers, no question that copying had occurred.
Thus, when the author of one of the photographs objected, a fair use analysis
followed. In this instance Koons was successful. The court noted that the
objective of Koons’s use of the photograph was different from that of the
author.133 The author intended the photograph to convey some sense of
eroticism.134 Conversely, according to Koons, “[he] want[ed] the viewer to
think about his/her personal experience with these objects, products, and
images and at the same time gain new insight into how these affect our lives.”135
Similar to his intent in Rogers, though, Koons’s objective was to use the work to
make a broader commentary.
The purpose of describing these two cases is not to assess the soundness of
their holdings or to attempt a reconciliation. The more pertinent question is
whether one could have confidently ascertained the limits of the property rights
of either plaintiff by examining the original works themselves and the works
resulting from Koons’s adaptations. In fact, it is not clear that a plaintiff or an
attorney, having read Rogers v. Koons, could confidently predict the outcome in
Blanch v. Koons. The distinctions between the decision in Rogers and Blanch are
fine ones that can give rise to greatly differing views about the application of
fair use. This uncertainty is a barrier against ex ante settlements.
6. The Property Rule. Interestingly, the property rule itself is a source of some
elements of the uncertainty with respect to what is bought and sold. This is a
slightly different matter than whether the rule gives rise to transaction costs—it
cannot help but do that. In terms of the analysis here, the narrower question is
whether the property rule makes valuation of the right more complex and less
predictable than a liability rule. At best, the property rule is no worse than the
liability rule, but a closer look makes it clear that the property rule imposes
more uncertainty-based barriers to bargaining than does the liability rule.

467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).
There were several images that were digitally scanned and assembled into a collage.
Eventually these were used to produce bill-board size paintings. Id. at 247.
133 Id. at 253.
134 Id. at 248.
135 Id. at 252.
131
132
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Consider Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.136 in which the
defendant included, without permission, songs owned by the plaintiff in a Las
Vegas stage production. The songs, from the play Kismet, constituted about
10% of the show Hallelujah Hollywood.137 Under the Copyright Act, Frank
Music was entitled to any damages suffered plus any profit attributed to the
work that was infringed. This included any indirect profits that could be
associated with gambling, rooms, and meals.138 In other words, the show, in
which Kismet was a part, led not just to profits associated with the show but
also had a promotional element in that it attracted customers to engage in other
profitable activities.
It should be noted that the determination requires the plaintiff to establish
gross profit due to the infringement while the defendant has the burden of
subtracting out other costs to determine what portion of the net profit is the
result of the infringement. In Frank Music, this meant determining how much
profit could be attributed to ten minutes of a 100-minute stage show.
Ultimately, the appellate court held that 2% was not clearly erroneous.139
Like notice or lack thereof and the generally vague standards for fair use, the
remedial issue itself injects uncertainty into the breadth of what is protected.
This, in turn, increases the likelihood of disparate expectations with respect to
the value of these rights and the difficulty of transactions. In the case of
remedial ambiguity under a property rule, it is even difficult to establish a
contract curve.140 For example, in Frank Music, the copyright holder would, in
theory, accept no less than the actual damages suffered, but would bargain for
that amount and as much of the profits generated by the infringement as
possible. The buyer would want to keep as much of the profit as possible and
certainly will not pay more than damages plus profit earned by virtue of the
would-be infringement. But asymmetrical information will come into play. The
copyright holder may not know what potential profits are,141 and the secondary
users will not be anxious to disclose. The secondary user may have little insight
into the damages the copyright holder can legitimately claim. In fact, both are
unlikely to know the limits of the contract curve142 and the risk that either one

886 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1548.
138 Id. at 1550.
139 Id.
140 A contract curve describes the range of prices that would be acceptable to both parties.
141 If the copyright holder does know the potential profits that does mean that the sums
involved would be part of damages.
142 See supra note 83. A contract curve is a range of prices the parties could agree on that would
leave at least one of them better off and no one worse off.
136
137
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will make a less than optimal deal simply adds to the bilateral monopoly
problem. In short, transaction costs are increased.
V. PROPOSALS
Contract law teaches us several things about an ideal copyright system. Four
of them are expanded upon in this concluding section.
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF FORMALITY

Many of the elements of contract law—offer, acceptance, consideration,
Statue of Frauds—can be viewed as formalistic, perhaps to a fault. These
requirements, though, help rationalize the system by creating a record of what
each party is to receive and to contribute to the transaction. They also lower the
burden on courts of determining the intent of the parties, whether there has
been a breach, and whether there is an appropriate remedy.
Copyright law is characterized by very little in the way of formality
principally because of the internationalization of copyright.143 For the U.S. this
meant a change from requiring copyright notice to permitting notice.144 The
costs of this lack of formality can be high in two ways: parties may assume a
work is copyrighted and not use it when it fact it is not protected and they may
assume it is not subject to copyright when it is. If one takes the view the
Copyright Act is, in effect, a form contract that a party can opt into, there may
be little way to determine if an author believes he or she is party to the contract.
The fact is that some works with notice are not eligible for copyright protection
and many works without notice are eligible. The problem is exacerbated in that
all works without notice include pre-1989 works that are in the public domain
whether they are otherwise copyrightable or not.145 Consequently, the absence
of notice has different implications depending on the date of the work.
A number of consequences flow from this. First, without notice, the
secondary user who has seen notice on other works may not understand that
those without notice may still be protected. Risk-averse secondary users will
avoid use of any existing works without notice including those in the public
domain. Finally, the author who was in no way motivated by the promise of
exclusivity may learn that he or she owns a copyright later and, at that point,

Notice is permitted under sections 401 and 402 of the 1976 Copyright Act.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 401, 402 (2006). An incentive to include copyright notice persists in that
the presence of notice will defeat a claim by an infringer that the infringement was not willful. A
willful infringement opens to the door to enhanced statutory damages.
145 This was subject to a narrow allowance for repairing the lack of notice. 17 U.S.C. § 405.
143
144
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begin asserting rights that should be reserved only for purposes of advancing
the aims of copyright.146
International agreements leave little room to reinstitute a notice requirement
like that that once existed but incentives could be increased to provide notice.147
Currently, the lack of notice may limit the availability of statutory damages.
This could be expanded upon by offering enhanced damages any time a work
with notice is infringed. In short, the incentive to provide notice would
increase but no notice would be required in order to recover standard damages.
This could be joined with a modification or expansion of section 403 of the
1976 Copyright Act. Sections 401 and 402 permit the inclusion of copyright
notice. Section 403 permits authors of works that are predominately composed
of United States government to include notice only if portions of the work that
are protected are identified. In short, section 403 does not require notice but, if
there is notice, the portions of the work that are protected must be identified.
Similarly, all authors wishing to take advantage of remedial enhancement of
damages by including notice could be required to identify the elements of a
work they deem protected and those that are not.148 The obvious analogy here
is a contract that specifies the duties of both parties. Another possibility,
although not recommended here due to the problems with property rules
discussed above, is to only allow recovery of the profits made by the infringing
party if the work included copyright notice.
B. APPLYING THE BARGAIN PRINCIPLE

Perhaps the most difficult problem to address relates to the notion of the
bargain principle underlying consideration in contract. There are two aspects to
this. First, when a work would be available without copyright protection, there
is little reason to grant protection. Second, not every work requires the same
copyright inducement in order to be created. As an extreme example, when a
work creates great wealth, a shorter contract duration or a charge for any
protection would be more consistent with contractual behavior.
Currently in a copyright action, there appears to be a presumption that any
work qualifying for copyright protection is, in turn, a product of that protection.

At this point the negative impact of not requiring notice may be fairly small. Most works in
circulation carry notice and the change in the law as of 1989 was that notice was not required.
Nevertheless, as copyright practice evolves, the practice of not including notice may increase as
will the uncertainty about which work may or may not be used without permission.
147 See supra note 124.
148 Even the portions identified as not protected may still be protected; otherwise, this proposal
would amount to a notice requirement. The remedy for infringement of those portions viewed as
not protected would result in decreased damages.
146
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That is, the party creating the work did so because of the exclusivity granted.
Common sense tells us that is actually not the case. A small step toward
rationalizing copyright law would be to make that presumption rebuttable. In
short, a secondary user who could show that there was no cognitive connection
between the creation of the work and a belief in exclusivity would shift the
burden to the author to demonstrate at least some element of reliance on the
exclusivity copyright offers. Although possibly radical, such a requirement
would have no impact on the output of creative works. Instead it would lower
the cost to the public of exclusivity in cases in which it was of no
consequence.149 Moreover, it would adhere closer to the Constitutional
provision that copyright exist “To promote” public welfare. There can be no
incentive or promotion when works are created without regard for copyright
protection.
C. THE CONCEPT OF BREACHING AUTHORS SHOULD BE DEVELOPED AND
FORMALIZED

In contract law, parties who enter into a contract but do not perform are
typically liable for damages. In a sense, copyright is consistent with this in that
a party who claims to qualify for copyright protection and claims there is an
infringement will not succeed on that claim if he or she had not performed.
That, however, is only part of the problem. Even if there is no infringement
action, a false claim of copyright generates damages for those who pay for
licensing and those who are discouraged from using the work even though it is
part of the public domain.150
Once an author claims copyright and does not “perform” there is, in effect,
a contract breach. The damage is generalized and most private parties are not
well suited for responding. In this sense, the contract analogy breaks down. In
fact, there may be positive externalities associated with the exposure of false
copyright claims.151 In these instances, the proper remedy is an agency action.
In effect, the false claim of copyright is more like misrepresentation or unfair
competition. Fines and cease-and-desist orders, in cases of false copyright
claims, are probably only at this point a distant possibility, for the policy for a
reaction is a compelling one.

149 Whether this would require amendment of the Copyright Act is not clear. If one relies on
the language of the Constitution, enforcement of the Act when an author has no expectation of
exclusivity when creating a work does not “promote” the “Arts and Sciences.” There may be
room for a public policy defense to infringement actions to develop.
150 See generally MAZZONE, supra note 45.
151 An individual party successfully challenging the validity of a copyright claim may benefit but
will not internalize the benefits to others of having the false claim exposed.
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D. THE REMEDY FOR INFRINGEMENT SHOULD BE DAMAGES

The standard remedy in contract law is damages—the application of a
liability rule. Whatever the basis for the rule in the context of contracts,
copyright presents an even more compelling case. As noted in the discussion
above,152 property rules protect subjective values. In many instances, this
makes sense from an economic standpoint. In copyright, though, this is turned
on its head. Any subjective values are tantamount to moral rights. Not only
does the Copyright Act protect moral rights at a very minimal level, it is clear
that the Act invites works to be used in ways an author would find
objectionable.153 Any notion that subjective or sentimental values should be
accounted for is inconsistent with the theme of the Act. Moreover, the current
remedial regime merely adds to the costs of contracting. In fact, there are no
legitimate copyright interests protected by a property rule that are not protected
by a liability rule at a lower social cost.
VI. FINAL THOUGHTS
Copyright law could learn a great deal from basic contract law principles.
The analogy is an appropriate one because the public does, in effect, buy the
creative efforts of authors in exchange for limited exclusivity. Yet, the benefits
of a contract law approach have, for the most part, fallen victim to political and
narrow financial pressures that disconnect copyright from a general welfaremaximizing policy. The “deal” struck by the agents of the public bears little
resemblance to a negotiated outcome. Starting from the point of view of what
would happen in a low transaction costs context, this Article suggests
adjustments that would lead to a better outcome are possible in the transaction
costs environment of copyright law.

See supra notes 84–88.
Criticism is one of the mainstays of fair use. In addition, it has been cited as a way to
reconcile the restrictions on speech created by copyright with First Amendment protections. See
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 554–59 (1985); Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–28 (2003).
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